On December 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a national bank’s practice of posting payments to checking accounts in a particular order is a federally authorized pricing decision, and that federal law preempts the application of state law to dictate a national bank’s order of posting. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 10-16959, 2012 WL 6684748 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2012). In this case, after trial the district court enjoined the bank’s practice of ordering withdrawals from “high-to-low” and ordered the bank to pay $203 million in restitution. The court agreed with customers who had sued the bank on behalf of a class that the bank’s ordering practice was designed to maximize the number of customer overdrafts and related fees and as such violated the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). On appeal, the court held that the bank’s ordering practice is a pricing decision the bank can pursue under federal law, and that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts the unfair business practices prong of the UCL. The court also held that both the imposition of affirmative disclosure requirements and liability based on failure to disclose are preempted. However, the court held that the NBA does not preempt the customers’ claim of affirmative misrepresentations under the fraudulent prong of the UCL. The court also considered as an issue of first impression the effect of the Supreme Court’s intervening ruling in Concepcion on a judgment on appeal after trial. The court declined to grant arbitration, reasoning that the bank’s post-judgment arbitration request was contrary to its conduct throughout the litigation, and that granting the request would prejudice the plaintiff and frustrate the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and its $203 million restitution order, and directed the district court to determine appropriate relief on the state fraud claims.

On November 14, the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the National Credit Union Administration, and the FDIC supplemented a prior statement on the impact of Hurricane Sandy on customers and the operations of financial institutions. The supplemental guidance identifies activities that could be considered “reasonable and prudent” steps to assist affected customers, including, for example (i) waiving certain fees and penalties, including ATM and overdraft fees, (ii) easing credit limits and terms for new loans, and (iii) offering payment accommodations. The regulators also provide post-storm guidance regarding loan modifications, the Community Reinvestment Act, and customer identification. The guidance largely mirrors guidance issued by the FDIC on November 9, 2012 in Financial Institution Letter FIL-47-2012.

On October 9, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petitions for writ of certiorari filed by plaintiffs in two cases challenging the overdraft billing practices of certain banks. Hough v. Regions Financial Corp., No. 12-1139, 2012 WL 3097294 (Oct. 9, 2012); Buffington v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 12-146, 2012 WL 3134482 (Oct. 9, 2012). In March, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued two separate, but substantively similar, opinions regarding arbitration agreements at issue in the overdraft litigation. Hough v. Regions Financial Corp., No. 11-14317, 2012 WL 686311 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2012); Buffington v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 11-14316, 2012 WL 660974 (11th Cir. Mar. 1, 2012). In both cases, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the Eleventh Circuit vacated district court rulings that the banks’ arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable under Georgia law because they contained a class action waiver. After further proceedings on remand yielded a second appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that, under Georgia law, an agreement is not unconscionable because it lacks mutuality of remedy. It also rejected the district court’s holding that the clauses were procedurally unconscionable because the contract did not meet the Georgia standard that an agreement must be so one-sided that “’no sane man not acting under a delusion would make [it] and … no honest man would’ participate in the transaction.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision not to review the Eleventh Circuit decisions will now require the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against the banks.

On May 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida certified a nationwide class of plaintiffs alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes with regard to the overdraft practices of a national bank. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, MDL No. 2036, slip op. (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2012). The plaintiffs claim that the bank created a scheme in which it manipulated debit card transactions to increase the number of overdraft fees charged to customers by re-ordering daily transactions from highest to lowest dollar amount, resulting in a higher number of individual overdraft transactions. After a year of class discovery, the court held that the class meets the four prerequisites for certification under Rule 23(a)–numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The defendant argued that the claims made by the plaintiffs were similar to questions raised in the Supreme Court’s decision in Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), where the Court rejected class certification in an employment discrimination suit due to insufficient commonality. The district court disagreed, holding that because the plaintiffs all were subject to the same uniform corporate policy, the reason why each class member was harmed is not at issue, as it was in Dukes. Other bank defendants have faced and continue to face similar allegations in several other suits, including some that have been consolidated with the above action. Several of those defendants have settled, including most recently a $62 million agreement announced on May 11, 2012.